Determining the Taxable Status of Trusts That Run Businesses by Doolin, Colleen J.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 6 August 1985 Article 5
Determining the Taxable Status of Trusts That Run
Businesses
Colleen J. Doolin
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Colleen J. Doolin, Determining the Taxable Status of Trusts That Run Businesses , 70 Cornell L. Rev. 1143 (1985)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol70/iss6/5
NOTES
DETERMINING THE TAXABLE STATUS OF TRUSTS
THAT RUN BUSINESSES
Section 7701 of the Internal Revenue Code' draws the broad
class of organizations called "associations" 2 within the ambit of the
rules for taxing corporations. The Treasury regulations promul-
gated under section 77013 and the cases interpreting that section 4
set forth guidelines establishing when a trust 5 may qualify as an "as-
sociation." Under the Treasury regulations the IRS will not subject
a trust that resembles a corporation in form to double corporate
taxation unless it meets a two-pronged, functional test.6
This Note addresses the policies underlying the taxation of
trusts that resemble corporations. 7 It isolates the grantor's intent in
forming the trust as the dispositive factor in determining whether
the trust is taxed as a trust or as an association at corporate rates. It
concludes that the regulations set forth sound guidelines for han-
dling the classification question.
An understanding of why a trust can be similar in form to a
corporation and still not be taxed as an association requires close
1 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1982) states: "The term 'corporation' includes associations
2 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (1960). An "association" describes any "organization
whose characteristics require it to be classified for purposes of taxation as a corporation
rather than as another type of organization such as a partnership or a trust." See infra
note 6.
s Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -4 (1960).
4 See infra notes 32-71 and accompanying text.
5 In general, the term "trust" as used in the Internal Revenue Code refers
to an arrangement created by a will or by an inter vivos declaration
whereby trustees take title to property for the purpose of protecting or
conserving it for the beneficiaries under the ordinary rules applied in
chancery or probate courts.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960).
6 I.R.C. § 11(a) (1982) imposes a tax on the taxable income of every corporation,
and I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1982) includes entities classified as "associations" in its defini-
tion of a corporation. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960) states: "The term 'corpora-
tion' is not limited to the artificial entity usually known as a corporation, but includes
also . . . a trust classed as an association because of its nature or its activities . ... "
The Code treats this type of association, based on its tax status, as a corporation for all
purposes. See J. MERTENS, THE LAw oF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 38A.01 (rev. ed.
1984); J. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, FEDERAL TAXATION OF TRUSTS, GRANTORS AND BENE-
FICIARIES 12.05[B] (1978 & Supp. 1983).
7 See infra notes 72-89 and accompanying text.
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scrutiny of the policies underlying the taxation of ordinary trusts.8
Ordinary trusts escape the double taxation imposed on corpora-
tions9 because they represent a form of property distribution which
society values and seeks to protect. Because society wants property
owners to be able to protect and conserve property for the benefit
of others,10 the rules governing taxation of trusts seek to give effect
to the grantor's intent, even if the trust is identical in form to a
8 I.R.C. § 641 (b) (1982). "The taxable income of [a]. . . trust shall be computed
in the same manner as in the case of an individual. . . . The tax shall be computed on
such taxable income and shall be paid by the fiduciary." I.R.C. subchapterJ, subparts A-
E, deal with the taxation of trusts.
Trust taxation operates on a "conduit" principle, with the trust, a separate taxable
entity, reporting and computing its tax in a manner similar to that of an individual tax-
payer. The trustee deducts the amount of income that he distributed to the beneficiary
or was required to distribute to the beneficiary, resulting in one-time taxation. Estate
Planning After the Economic Recovey Tax Act of 1981, TAx MGMT. (BNA) No. 11-9th, at A-21
to -22 (1982). For a detailed discussion of the rules governing taxation of trusts, see
Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates-General, TAx MGMT. (BNA) No. 406 (Aug. 13, 1979 &
Supp. May 14, 1984).
The main differences between the taxation of trusts and the taxation of individuals
are (1) that the IRS allows a trust a deduction of either $100 or $300 per year in lieu of
the personal exemption and dependency deductions allowed under I.R.C. § 642(b)
(1982); (2) that instead of the zero bracket amount, trusts must use a separate rate
schedule, I.R.C. § 1 (e) (1981), under which the first dollar of taxable income is subject
to tax; (3) that a trust's deduction for charitable contributions is not subject to the 20-
30-50% limits of I.R.C. § 170 (1982), and in certain cases is not restricted to amounts
actually paid during the taxable year, but instead is allowed for any amount of gross
income which the trust provisions set aside for charitable purposes, I.R.C. § 642(c)
(1982); (4) that the trust may deduct the amount of current income taxed to the benefi-
ciaries, I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661(a) (1982). See B. BrrrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 453 (5th ed. 1980); G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRusTs AND TRUSTEES § 261 (rev.
2d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1983).
9 The IRS taxes corporations on their income at the corporate level and taxes the
corporations' shareholders on their dividends. The IRS uses the same tax scheme for
trusts adjudged to be "associations" taxable as corporations. G. BOGERT, supra note 8,
§ 247.
10 Federal policies further this societal value in several ways. First, there are tax
advantages in adopting a trust which merely "protect[s] and conserv[es]" property.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960). See supra note 8. Second, the government leaves
the grantor free to structure his trust as he chooses, the trust being one of the most
flexible devices in the legal system. One advantage of a trust is that it can "be employed
for such purposes and subject to such provisions as the settlor may choose." 1 A. SCOTT,
THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 59, at 563 (3d ed. 1967). This flexibility is of enormous advan-
tage to a settlor creating a way to care for his family. In discussing the living trust, one
commentator said: "The [grantor] may be interested in protecting his wife and children
against their inexperience in business matters, or he may feel they are apt to make im-
prudent expenditures or gifts or may live beyond their means." G. BOGERT, supra note
8, § 231. This Note uses the terms "grantor" and "settlor" interchangeably. See
BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1231 (5th ed. 1979). The case law does distinguish a settlor as
one who "'furnishes the consideration for the creation of a trust. . . even though in
form the trust is created by another.'" Lehman v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 99, 100 (2d
Cir. 1940) (quoting A. SCOTr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 156.3, at 785 (3d ed. 1967) (foot-
note omitted)).
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corporation."
To give greater effect to a grantor's intent, the regulations 12
and the cases interpreting them' 3 have focused on two factors in
determining the appropriate method of taxation for a trust that is
similar in form to a corporation. First, the trust beneficiaries must
be passive recipients of a grantor's good will rather than active par-
ticipants indistinguishable from associates in a joint venture.' 4
Either the grantor or the beneficiaries themselves may establish the
trust as long as it provides for the beneficiaries without needless ac-
tivity on their parts.
Second, the trust must merely "protect and conserve" the trust
corpus rather than operate as a profit-making business. 15 The
courts regard the literal language of the trust instrument as the pri-
mary evidence of a trust's purpose. Any trust that the IRS deems to
be an association must have a "business purpose." These two char-
acteristics-associates and business purpose-must be present
before a trust will be taxed as an association. 16 Such entities, con-
sisting of people who voluntarily come together to run a business
for profit, should be taxed as associations. 17
Part I of this Note briefly discusses the policies underlying taxa-
tion of trusts and reviews Morrissey v. Commissioner, 8 which first ar-
ticulated the current tests for determining whether trusts should be
taxed as associations. Part II examines in detail the application of
the "associates" and "business purpose" tests developed by the
courts since Morrissey. Part III describes the applicable regulations
and demonstrates that although they do not explicitly define "asso-
ciates" and "business purpose," the regulations imply that the two
tests must be applied not independently, but conjunctively. This
part then illustrates how improper results can be reached if the two
tests are applied independently. Part IV examines the application of
the "business purpose" test, and demonstrates that courts some-
times violate fundamental tax principles in finding a "business pur-
l 1 "It is sometimes said. . . that the intention of the settlor is the law of the trust."
I A. Scorr, THE LAw OF TRUSTS § 59, at 563 (3d ed. 1967) (footnote omitted).
12 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4 (1960). See infra notes 72-89.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 90-103.
14 See infra notes 34-47 and text accompanying note 81.
15 See infra notes 48-71 and text accompanying note 82.
16 "[T]he determination of whether a trust which has such characteristics is to be
treated for tax purposes as a trust or as an association depends on whether there are
associates and an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom." Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960). Trusts generally have four additional characteristics
common to both trusts and corporations. They are: "(iii) continuity of life, (iv) centrali-
zation of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate property,
and (vi) free transferability of interests." Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(1).
17 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b) (1960).
18 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
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pose." The Note concludes that the regulations correctly
incorporate the two factors, "associates" and "business purpose,"
in the test for determining how trusts should be taxed.
I
MORRISSEY AND THE REGULATIONS
The courts and the Commissioner currently use the six charac-
teristics developed by the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Commissioner19 to decide whether a business entity is a trust or an
association.20 The six characteristics common to all corporations
are associates, business purpose, continuity of life, centralization of
management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests.
However, only the first two characteristics, associates and business
purpose, are generally considered determinative of a trust's taxable
status,21 as the last four characteristics are generally common to
19 Id. at 359-60.
20 Morrissey and three companion cases decided the same day involved distinguish-
ing trusts from associations. Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Helvering
v. Combs, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Assocs., 296 U.S. 369
(1935). The Court had made various attempts during the 15 years before Morrissey to
determine the taxable status of business-associated trusts. The first major case of this
type was Crocker v. Malley, 249 U.S. 223 (1919). The Crocker Court formulated a two-
part test for determining a trust's status. Only if the trustees actively managed the busi-
ness rather than passively collected and distributed the income, and the beneficiaries
exerted some control over the trustees, would the trust be taxed as a corporation. Id. at
232-33. See also Dean, Federal Taxation of Trusts as Associations, 14 TEMP. L.Q. 333, 335
(1940). The corporation in Crocker leased mill property and then transferred the leased
property to trustees for its stockholders as beneficiaries. The trustees had extensive
powers, such as an owner would, and remained free from the beneficiaries' control. The
Court concluded that the arrangement was not taxable as an association because trust-
ees normally collect rent, as they did in this case. The Court suggested that the benefi-
ciaries' lack of control over the property precluded the possibility that an "association"
existed. 249 U.S. at 233-34. The Commissioner and the courts interpreted this decision
as requiring control by the beneficiaries in order to find an association. See Dean, supra,
at 335-36; Spinney, Multiple Settlor Trusts: Taxability as Association Re-Examined, 89 TR. &
EsT. 458, 459 (1950).
Five years later, in Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144 (1924), the Court revised the two-
part test, replacing the beneficiary-control factor with a determination of whether trust-
ees were acting as directors of a corporation and operating the trust in quasi-corporate
form. Id. at 161. See Dean, supra, at 336. Hecht involved a family trust with property
consisting of offices and businesses, which the trustees managed. The Court held the
trust to be an association because the trustees were doing more than passively collecting
and distributing income. They exercised general and exclusive powers of management
and could fill vacancies among the trustees, elect other trustees, sell property, and
amend the trust instrument. 265 U.S. at 161.
21 Recently courts have taken the approach of looking only to associates and busi-
ness purpose to determine a trust's tax status, as in Elm St. Realty Trust v. Commis-
sioner, 76 T.C. 803 (1981); Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376 (Ct. Cl. 1974); and
National Savings & Trust Co. v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1968). The Elm
Street court stated: "Not only are [associates and business purpose] essential to any asso-
ciation classification, they are also usually the only ones that are relevant when it be-
comes necessary to distinguish between a trust and an association." 76 T.C. at 809. But
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both trusts and corporations. 22
In considering this association-identity problem, the Court ig-
nored mere cosmetic resemblance, such as the use of corporate
structure or terminology or the presence or absence of formal "di-
rectors" or "officers." '23 If, however, "the 'trustees'. . . function 'in
much the same manner as the directors in a corporation' for the
purpose of carrying on the enterprise," 24 the Court declared that it
would treat the enterprise as a corporation for tax purposes. 25 Mor-
rissey introduced the idea that even though a trust might appear
identical to a corporation, its "nature and purpose" were the deter-
mining factors. 26 If the intent of the settlors was not to create an
"organized community of effort" 27 to operate a business, but rather
to hold property for the "benefit of named or described persons," 28
the Court would consider the enterprise a trust. Trust owners do
not ordinarily "plan a common effort or enter into a combination" 29
see Rev. Rul. 258, 1975-2 C.B. 503, 505 ("the determination of whether the [trust] is to
be treated for tax purposes as an association depends upon whether it has a preponderance
(more than two) of the following corporate characteristics: continuity of life, centralized
management, free transferability of interests, and limited liability") (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
22 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960).
23 In gauging association status, structural similarity to corporations is a factor, but
the Morrissey Court emphasized that "it is resemblance and not identity" which the Court
considers. 296 U.S. at 357. Similar language is found in Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert
Assocs., 296 U.S. 369, 373 (1935):
If such differences [of formal procedure] were to be made the test in de-
termining whether or not an enterprise for the transaction of business
constitutes an association, the subject would be enveloped in a cloud of
uncertainty, and enterprises of the same essential character would be
placed in different categories simply by reason of formal variations in
mere procedural details.
24 296 U.S. at 358 (quoting Hecht v. Malley, 265 U.S. 144, 161 (1924)).
25 The Internal Revenue Code does not define the term "corporation," leaving the
task to the Commissioner, the courts, and the commentators. Two prominent scholars
have formulated an analogy that should prove amusing as well as useful: "[A] corpora-
tion, like a lobster pot, is easy to enter, difficult to live in, and virtually impossible to get
out of." B. BrTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND
SHAREHOLDERS 2.01, at 2-4 (4th ed. 1979). SeeJ. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, supra note 6,
at 12-20.
26 296 U.S. at 357. The Morrissey case involved a trust created to develop real estate
and to build and operate a golf course and clubhouse. The trustees had broad powers
to buy, sell, lease, and operate the land the trust owned. The trust instrument empow-
ered them to collect income and make investments and loans. The trustees developed
and sold some of the trust property, built the golf course, and later conveyed it to a
corporation in exchange for stock. The trustees for a time continued to lease and oper-
ate the course, but eventually confined their activities to collecting income, selling land,
and distributing the proceeds to the beneficiaries. The Court determined that such a
venture was an association taxable as a corporation, finding associates and a business
purpose.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 356-57.
29 Id. at 357.
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to conduct a business; therefore, most trusts will escape double cor-
porate taxation.
In concentrating on the intent of those responsible for the trust
rather than on the nature of the trust's business, the focus ofjudicial
scrutiny reflects federal policy in this area. A trust may conduct
business in a manner identical to that of a corporation, provided the
intent of the trust creators is to care for others and not to create "a
medium for the conduct of a business and sharing its gains." 30
To ensure the continuation of these policies, the Morrissey Court
scrutinized the trust to see whether it had associates and a business
purpose. 31 Associates who voluntarily and actively manage their
trust for the business purpose of pursuing profit are deemed by the
IRS to have an association taxable at corporate rates rather than a
trust taxable at trust rates. After Morrissey, the courts refined these
characteristics on a case-by-case basis as litigants challenged differ-
ent aspects of their definitions.
II
DEFINING ASSOCIATES AND BUSINESS PURPOSE
Of the six factors enumerated in Morrissey, the presence of
two-associates and business purpose-are generally determinative
of association status.32 This Note discusses only these two major
characteristics, presuming the existence of all four of the minor
characteristics: continuity of life, centralization of management,
limited liability, and free transferability of interests.33 This part sets
forth the tests the courts have used to detect the presence of the two
major factors.
30 Id.
31 Morrissey advanced the approach that "trusts that ... satisfy the primary concep-
tion of association and have the [other corporate] attributes [are]. . .sufficiently analo-
gous to corporate organization tojustify the conclusion that Congress intended that the
income of the enterprise should be taxed in the same manner as that of corporations."
Id. at 360. The criteria for determining whether trusts have "associates" or a "business
purpose" are clearly stated:
"Association" implies associates. It implies the entering into ajoint
enterprise, and, as the applicable regulation imports, an enterprise for
the transaction of business. This is not the characteristic of an ordinary
trust-whether created by will, deed, or declaration-by which particular
property is conveyed to a trustee or is to be held by the settlor, on speci-
fied trusts, for the benefit of named or described persons. Such benefi-
ciaries do not ordinarily, and as mere cestuis que trust, plan a common
effort or enter into a combination for the conduct of a business
enterprise.
Id. at 356-57.
32 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
33 See supra text accompanying note 22.
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A. Cases Establishing the Definitional Framework
1. Determining the Presence of Associates
A court will not characterize an entity as an association absent
associates. In deciding whether an entity has associates, a court re-
views both the trust instrument and the actions of the beneficiaries
or trustee-beneficiaries and determines (1) whether the beneficiaries
have voluntarily associated themselves, and (2) whether they have
participated actively in operating the trust.34 The presence of either
factor qualifies the participants as associates.
The first factor is dispositive because members who associate
themselves voluntarily have exerted the concerted volitional activity
characteristic of associates. 35 Thus, beneficiaries of testamentary
trusts usually will not be deemed associates because their benefici-
ary status has been bestowed on them by another.3 6
Where the beneficiaries have not voluntarily associated them-
selves, a court will still look at their degree of participation in the
trust's management. Even if the beneficial interest in the trust is
merely nominal, any participation beyond collecting the trust's prof-
its will trigger associate status.37 Thus beneficiaries who have no
34 In determining the presence of associates, the tax court has emphasized the
beneficiaries' role in creating the trust as well as the extent of their participation in the
trust's business activities. See, e.g., Elm St. Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803,
815 (1981).
35 The Morissey Court concluded that beneficiaries must engage in some concerted
volitional activity to be associates and stated that beneficiaries "do not ordinarily...
plan a common effort or enter into a combination for the conduct of a business enter-
prise." 296 U.S. at 357.
36 E.g., United States v. Davidson, 115 F.2d 799, 800-01 (6th Cir. 1940). Davidson
involved a testamentary trust that directed the trustee to liquidate the trust and dis-
tribute it to the beneficiaries. The court found it significant that the beneficiaries did not
voluntarily form or continue the trust. In addition, two of the four beneficiaries were
unaware of the trust until more than six months after its creation, and the third benefici-
ary had consistently objected both to the creation of the trust and to its administration.
37 Although one court considered an interest in the corpus, along with an interest
in the profits, to be enough to tip the balance, other courts have not distinguished be-
tween these two ownership rights. In Titus v. United States, 150 F.2d 508, 511 (10th
Cir. 1945), the owner of a corporation issued a tiny fraction of the outstanding shares to
family members. He later formed a trust, of which he was sole trustee and manager, and
transferred all the shares of the corporation, which later was dissolved, to the trust,
keeping the same division of ownership. He tried to avoid taxation of the trust as an
association by arguing that there were no associates. The court found associates even
though the family members' involvement was limited to an interest in the corpus of the
estate and its profits. By contrast, the court in Commissioner v. Guitar Trust Estate, 72
F.2d 544, 546-47 (5th Cir. 1934), found no associates in a similar situation. See infra
note 38.
The Titus court probably was influenced by the taxpayer's use of a trust to conduct
the same business as a corporation. The court said that "[i]f this arrangement was effec-
tive to create a corporation it is difficult to see why it would not constitute an association
in the nature of a corporation, all other elements necessary to make such an association
being present." 150 F.2d at 511. In its reasoning the court ignored the Morrissey direc-
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input in controlling their trustee-managed business do not qualify
as associates.38 However, if they act in conjunction with the trustee
to operate the business, they do qualify as associates. 39 Similarly, a
business entity may have associates if the beneficiaries control the
business through another person acting as a common agent or
trustee-manager.40 Finally, a sole beneficiary actively operating a
trust and its business can be an associate, even though the word
"associate" usually connotes one of at least two people. 41
Some courts have imposed associate status on beneficiaries who
were not active participants when the trust was established but later
became active. For instance, if the beneficiaries did not create their
trust, but later became involved in its activities by conducting and
expanding a corporation placed in trust, they may be deemed asso-
ciates. 42 Accordingly, a Revenue Ruling43 criticized the Tax Board
for not designating beneficiaries as associates after the beneficiaries
had made sizable contributions to the trust that they had neither
tive that formal resemblance to a corporation does not qualify an entity as an association
and failed to analyze the transaction as a whole.
38 In Guitar Trust Estate, 72 F.2d at 546, settlors of a trust property reserved to them-
selves a two-tenths interest in the million-dollar trust. The remaining eight-tenths went
to their eight children. The beneficiaries could neither manage the business nor select
trustees. The court found the trust's only resemblance to a corporation was its estab-
lishment to continue a going business and concluded that this was not unusual.
But see Cooper v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 530, 535 (10th Cir. 1958) (family trust
created with express purpose of operating trust properties and not liquidating them
deemed an association).
39 E.g., Berry Bros. Trust v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 71, 76 (1947) (where trust in-
strument gave trustees/beneficiaries authority to "own, control, operate, and manage"
until all but one original trustee died, whereupon trust was to be liquidated, court re-
jected trustees' contentions that trust's "primary and sole purpose . . .[was] to liqui-
date the corpus at the proper time and to conserve it in the interim").
40 E.g., Kilgallon v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 337, 337-38, 340 (7th Cir. 1938) (where
landowners conveyed property to trustee-manager, vesting him with broad powers to
hold, manage, improve, and dispose of land for benefit of owners and others who be-
came beneficiaries, court described beneficiaries as "promoters of the business ven-
ture," and trustee-manager device did not save them from being associates).
41 The court in Lombard Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 136 F.2d 22, 23 (9th Cir.
1943), interpreting the word "beneficiaries" in the 1936 Treasury regulations as includ-
ing the singular, ruled that a sole beneficiary served by the organized activities of the
trustees was an associate.
42 In Porter Property Trustees, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 42 B.T.A. 681, 689-91
(1940), a family owning agricultural lands created a trust that took over the corporation
which was operating the farm business and designated some of its members as trustees
and others as beneficiaries. The court identified the key to characterizations of trusts
formed for tax purposes when it noted that "[o]utside the statute's reach lie trusts cre-
ated to safeguard and conserve the property of widows and infants .... ." Id. at 690.
Concluding that this family contained no persons meeting that description, the court
found that the "parents and children happily associated together ...in carrying on
their farming operations" and were associates. Id.
43 Rev. Rul. 534, 1957-2 C.B. 924.
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created nor contributed to originally. 44
The trust instrument cannot transform beneficiaries into associ-
ates if they are otherwise passive or prevent them from being associ-
ates if they are otherwise active.45 The powers granted to the
beneficiaries in the trust instrument may be significant, however, in
showing intent to actively operate a business association.46 Con-
versely, if beneficiaries unite to conduct business on the basis of im-
plied powers, courts may find associates in the absence of a formal
trust declaration.47
2. Determining Business Purpose
The second major factor the courts consider in determining
how a trust should be taxed is whether the trust has a business pur-
pose. Although "every trust involves some business activity," 48 a
problem arises when the trust engages too extensively in business
activity. 49 Courts examining a trust for the presence of a business
purpose focus primarily on the language of the trust instrument and
44 In Living Funded Trust of Harry E. Lyman v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 161, 166
(1937), nonacq. 1957-2 C.B. 8, the grantor conveyed his business in trust to his family
for their "'maintenance, welfare, comfort and happiness.'" The court concluded that
because the beneficiaries did not establish the trust and could not modify or terminate it,
they could not be associates. Id. at 167-68. Although the IRS acquiesced to this deci-
sion in 1937-2 C.B. 17, it later withdrew its acceptance in 1957-2 C.B. 8, as explained by
Rev. Rul. 534, 1957-2 C.B. 924. The later Revenue Ruling reached a point not ad-
dressed by the Lyman court when it noted that far from being passive, the beneficiaries
on six different occasions contributed more than $100,000 in property to the settlor's
original $65,985. 36 B.T.A. at 164. For a further discussion of the case, see infra note
72.
45 E.g., Blum v. Commissioner, 25 B.T.A. 119, 126 (1932) (trustees and benefi-
ciaries with same interest in trust enterprise were not associates because trustee's duties
were confined to collecting and disbursing rent from trust property); accord Monrovia
Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 83 F.2d 417, 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1936) (beneficiaries deemed
associates when they contributed assets to pursue business purpose, even though trust
instrument specified that beneficiaries were not associates); see also Helvering v. Combs,
296 U.S. 365, 368 (1935) (Supreme Court imposed association status on oil trust noting
that "the fact that the beneficiaries did not exercise control is not determinative").
46 E.g., White v. Hornblower, 27 F.2d 777, 778 (1st Cir. 1928) (where trustees had
power to modify provisions of liquidating trust upon agreement by majority of certificate
holders, court concluded that beneficiaries' control over the trust was not determining
factor and allowed entity's status as liquidating trust).
47 E.g., Thrash Lease Trust v. Commissioner, 99 F.2d 925, 927-28 (5th Cir. 1938)
(where oil lease assigned in trust but formal trust instrument never drawn up, percent-
age holders were associates united to carry on business). The court in Thrash Lease
failed, however, to explain its characterization of the percentage holders as being
"united" without a trust agreement, given that they had different degrees of interest in
the lease.
48 Walker v. United States, 194 F. Supp. 522, 527 (D. Mass. 1961) (trust whose
primary purpose was orderly liquidation of trust estate not taxable as corporation).
49 Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 356. " 'Association' implies. . . entering into ajoint enter-
prise. . . for the transaction of business." Id.
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only rarely need to examine the trust's actual activities. 50 The
Supreme Court established this approach in the 1935 case, Helvering
v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates.51 The Court's rationale was that the level
of activity authorized by the trust instrument retains its vitality no
matter how long the powers lie dormant. For example, the trust
instrument in Morrissey authorized the trustees to conduct business,
and the Court found a business purpose even though the trustees
had engaged in no business during the taxable year.52
Courts accord great weight to the wording of the trust instru-
ment and sometimes find a business purpose where its existence ac-
tually is quite tenuous. In one case, 53 a trust divested from its
business operations by selling its real property, but retained the
right to foreclose on and reacquire the property. After the transac-
tion, the trustee failed to amend the trust instrument to reflect the
reduction in his powers.5 4 The court subsequently found a business
purpose, reasoning that the trustee could regain control of the
property and exercise the power authorized in the trust instrument
to operate the trust as a business again. 55
The parties cannot deny the plain language of the trust instru-
50 Fletcher v. Clark, 150 F.2d 239, 240-41 (10th Cir. 1945). The trustees in Fletcher
had extensive powers to operate or develop six Wyoming mines owned by 18 benefi-
ciaries. Although the trustees could execute deeds, leases, contracts, or other instru-
ments at their discretion, the trust never owned mining equipment or operated a mine.
The court cited Morrissey in rejecting the beneficiaries' contention that the test for busi-
ness purpose is whether the enterprise actually operated, not the scope of authority
permitted. The court concluded that the business purpose is found in the trust declara-
tion, and it is irrelevant whether the trustees actually exercise the declared powers.
51 296 U.S. 365, 369 (1935). The blueprint for this rule was set forth in Coleman-
Gilbert:
We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that weight should be
given to the purpose for which the trust was organized, but that purpose
is found in the agreement of the parties. Not only were they actually en-
gaged, as the Board of Tax Appeals determined, in carrying on an exten-
sive business for profit, but the terms of the trust instrument authorized a
wide range of activities in the purchase, improvement and sale of proper-
ties in the cities and towns of the state. The parties are not at liberty to
say that their purpose was other or narrower than that which they for-
mally set forth in the instrument under which their activities were
conducted.
Id. at 373-74.
52 In Morrissey, 296 U.S. at 361, the Court found that although the business transac-
tions in question had occurred prior to the years in question, the trust instrument still
determined the entity's status. "[Ilt was still an organization for profit, and the profits
were still coming in." See also, e.g., Reynolds v. Hill, 184 F.2d 294, 296-97 (8th Cir.
1950) (trust liable for taxes because it was carrying on business even though it was more
than 40 years after trust agreement).
53 Henry G. Mesier, 15 T.C.M. (P-H) 46,099, at 46-303 (1946).
54 Id. at 46-305.
55 Id. See also Sloan v. Commissioner, 63 F.2d 666, 667-69 (9th Cir. 1933) (trust
organized for subdividing property and collecting proceeds taxable as business even
though all lots were sold and trust only collected installment payments).
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ment. If the trust instrument expansively describes certain trustee
powers, the parties cannot claim that their purpose was narrower
than the boundaries of their permissible powers.5 6 The courts also
accept the plain language of the trust instrument, such as the stated
intent to liquidate a business, as proof that a trust transacting busi-
ness has no business purpose. In this type of situation, the courts
may allow the trust to transact a substantial amount of business and
even make a profit without concluding that the trust has a business
purpose. 57
Courts examine the trust instrument closely to resolve ambigu-
ity or lack of stated purpose. If the trust instrument has no express
purpose, courts may infer the purpose from the nature of the trust-
ees' powers. Trustees cannot avoid a court's finding of business
purpose by claiming their trust has a liquidation purpose if such
purpose is not stated in the instrument and the trustees have exten-
sive powers to run a business. 58 Even though a trust's unstated pur-
pose is consistent with mere preservation and conservation of
property, powers broad enough to allow the trustees to engage in
business may constitute a business purpose. 59
56 See Commissioner v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 148 F.2d 937, 938-39 (9th Cir.
1945) ("The character of the organization as to whether or not it is a 'business trust,' is
determined by what the instruments creating the trust empowered the trustee to per-
form, and not by what powers the trustee actually exercised."); Phillip Bordages Estate
Trust v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 62, 62 (5th Cir. 1947) (family trust of real property and
oil and mineral leases usually found to have business purpose when trustees empowered
to conduct any business on behalf of the trust). But see Commissioner v. Gibbs-Preyer
Trusts, 117 F.2d 619, 622-23 (6th Cir. 1941) ("The crucial test in determining whether a
trust is an association, taxable as a corporation, must be found in what the trustees actu-
ally do and not in the existence of long unused powers .... [W]e must look to the
actual activities of the entity rather than to its form or possible powers." (citations omit-
ted)). See also T. PESCHEL & E. SPURGEON, supra note 6, at 12-22.
57 See, e.g., Trustees for the Creditors and Stockholders of Gonzolus Creek Oil Co.
(Dissolved) v. Commissioner, 12 B.T.A. 310, 318-21 (1928). This trust consisted of the
assets of the dissolved Gonzolus Creek Oil Company which the trustees tried to sell.
The Internal Revenue Bureau held that the dissolved company, whose activities appar-
ently fell within applicable state law, had been a "bona fide trust" in 1923. Id. at 317.
See also Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust, 39 F.2d 43, 44-46 (5th Cir. 1930). A widow
organized a trust of her million-dollar Dallas property and ranchland for herself and her
five daughters. She directed the trustees to sell the property and distribute the proceeds
as quickly as possible, but empowered them to administer the property in the meantime.
The trustees engaged in business operations for more than a decade. The Blair court
characterized these activities as "slight business activities ... conducted ... in further-
ance of the ultimate purpose of liquidation and distribution." Id. at 46. The court rea-
soned that the trust could not be considered to be doing business since ultimately it was
to be liquidated. For a further discussion of the case, see infra note 72.
58 E.g., Williams Trust v. Commissioner, 39 B.T.A. 612, 624-25 (1939) (where ben-
eficiaries of real estate trust sought speedy liquidation of property but trust instrument
did not specify purpose, court looked at trustees' extensive powers and found intent to
engage in business activities for profit).
59 E.g., Estate of Cortlandt Parker, 12 T.C.M. (P-H) 43,415 (1943) (where trust's
purpose was to hold and conserve property and trustees' powers were not inconsistent
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Courts also may disregard a stated purpose in the trust instru-
ment if it seems inconsistent with the general tenor of the instru-
ment. Favorable tax status will not follow from simply including a
single sentence or phrase that rings contrary to a business purpose
in the trust instrument. For example, where one clause in a trust
instrument provides for liquidation, but the instrument gives the
trustees extensive power to run a business, that one clause will not
deter a court from finding a business purpose.60 Further, if the
powers of the trustees are so extensive that the trust obviously will
operate with a business purpose, the courts will disregard even a
stated liquidation purpose.61
Finally, a trust's function sometimes is obscured by a forest of
technical arrangements in the instrument. In such cases, courts will
look at the organizational structure, the activities conducted, and
the organizers' purpose as stated in the trust instrument to deter-
mine business purpose. For example, trustees may try to prevent
their trust from qualifying as an association by voluntarily relin-
quishing some of their powers of management and operation, but
unless they amend the trust instrument to eliminate these powers,
the trust will have a business purpose.6 2
with holding property for this purpose, but were also broad enough to allow trustees to
engage in a business, court held trust taxable as corporation).
60 E.g., Grange Trust, 14 T.C.M. (P-H) 45,136 (1945). The trustees had the
power to sell property at their discretion, lease it, build on or develop it to produce
more income, and buy and develop adjacent property. The trust was to be liquidated 21
years after "the death of the survivor of the presently existing issue of [one of the testa-
tors]." Id. at 45-455. The court said an uncertain future liquidation date did not
change the present character of the organization, which was running a business for
profit. Id. at 45-461. But cf Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust, 39 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1930)
(discussed supra note 57, infra note 72).
61 E.g., United States v. Hill, 142 F.2d 622, 623 (10th Cir. 1944). Four individuals
dissolved their partnership in a paper manufacturing company, then incorporated it.
They transferred the operating assets to the corporation and the remaining assets, con-
sisting of stocks and bonds, to the trust. The trust agreement stated the purpose of the
trust as providing for the liquidation and ultimate distribution of assets not transferred
to the corporation. However, the trustees bought and sold securities for profit, em-
ployed the services of investment experts, loaned money to the corporation, endorsed
notes, and transferred trust assets to the corporation. The court was unimpressed by
the purported distinction between the trust-run assets and those controlled by the cor-
poration: "[A] careful analysis of the entire instrument establishes beyond a doubt that
[liquidating and distributing assets] was not its real purpose. . . . [The purpose was] to
hold and employ this property for the benefit of the corporation and during such period
operate and manage it for profit and gain." Id.
62 See, e.g., Fidelity-Bankers Trust Co. v. Helvering, 113 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
Although the court admitted the difficulty of unraveling some of the complex arrange-
ments made by the trust, it found a business purpose with little trouble. The court said:
"[W]hen men reach out for legal advantages by technical arrangements which confuse
not only functions but forms, and are not consistent with their real objectives, or if so,
those objectives are conflicting, only confusion can result for them and, unfortunately,
too often for the law." Id. at 18. The court paid particular attention to the trust instru-
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Although the courts focus primarily on the trust instrument to
determine business purpose, the instrument alone is not always de-
cisive. The trust's activities may reveal its purpose where the instru-
ment is silent or where the purpose is "hidden." 63 Furthermore,
courts may look to potential activities, as well as existing activities,
to determine the purpose of a trust.64
B. Cases Decided After Promulgation of the Regulations
The Internal Revenue Service adopted regulations65 in 1960
that incorporated the Morrissey characteristics 66 and provided fur-
ther explanation for classifying trusts as associations. 67 The few
cases interpreting the regulations have adhered to well-established
precedent in scrutinizing trusts for evidence of corporate character-
istics. As in the pre-regulation cases, voluntary members of a trust 68
ment: "The modifying features [of the trust] cannot be given the effect of obliterating
the fundamental structural organization and function without doing violence to the in-
strument of creation, expertly drawn and executed by men of great business experience
and capacity, and to their expressed intentions carried out in their conduct." Id. at 22.
See also Commissioner v. Nebo Oil Co. Trust, 126 F.2d 148 (10th Cir. 1942). After a
period of actively running the trust, the trustee twice amended the trust instrument to
limit his powers. The court held that even after the powers were limited, the trustee was
not reduced to a mere "collection and disbursement agent," as he had retained essential
powers of management to operate the leases. Id. at 150. But see Michigan Ave. Syndi-
cate, 8 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 45,238 (1939). The trust in this case owned a piece of land in
Chicago with an eight-story store and office building. The trustee had extensive man-
agement powers. The land, however, was leased for 99 years to Woolworth's, and after
the company assumed its lease and took over the property in 1928, the trustees' powers
dwindled. Ten years later, the trustees adopted a resolution striking out the old trust
agreement and substituting more limited powers. The court said that if the features
resembling a corporation were effectively removed from the instrument, no justification
for taxing it as a corporation existed.
63 See supra note 62. The Fidelity-Bankers court considered instances where the lan-
guage in the instrument was not determinative of the trust's purpose, necessitating an
examination of the participants' activities to discover the trust's purpose. 113 F.2d at
20-2 1. See also Nee v. Main St. Bank, 174 F.2d 425 (8th Cir. 1949). The Nee court stated
that even when the trust instrument did not specify an enterprise purpose, the setting
and circumstances surrounding its creation may indicate that its objective was to operate
a business. Further, if the beneficiaries actually allow the trust to carry on an actual
enterprise, business purpose should be found. Id. at 429.
64 See Nee, 174 F.2d at 431. The court noted that although the trust language
"hold, manage, lease and handle said property" had not per se transcended an ordinary
trust, in "[t]hese circumstances and this setting" the land was potentially so promising
for oil that the trust "rose to the height of providing an instrumentality to permit and
facilitate exploitation of the property for profit." Id. The court concluded the trust
doubtless was created to take advantage of this business property.
65 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -4 (1960).
66 See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
67 See generally Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -4 (1960).
68 See, e.g., Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376, 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (multiple
beneficiaries who voluntarily join venture, such as by funding it, may be associates); Elm
St. Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803, 818 (1981) (holding that where benefi-
ciaries neither participated in trust's creation nor affirmatively joined enterprise, some
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and those who are actively involved in the trust's activities may be
associates. 69 Courts will find a business purpose through the trust-
ees' powers granted in the trust instrument 70 as well as the activities
conducted by those with a beneficial interest in the trust.71
III
THE REGULATIONS
The regulations addressing classification of an organization for
tax purposes stress the importance of the associates and business
purpose tests in determining whether a trust will be taxed as a cor-
poration.7 2 Of the six characteristics discussed in Morrissey, four
further voluntary activity by them would be necessary to satisfy associates requirement);
Rev. Rul. 258, 1975-2 C.B. 503, 504 (persons who accept shares of beneficial interest in
business enterprise may be associates).
69 See, e.g., Elm St. Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803, 818 (1981) (benefi-
ciaries whose involvement in trust's activities was limited by conditions attached to exer-
cise of their powers, such as concurrence by other beneficiaries or trustee, could not
effect an "unfettered, significant influence" on trust ana were not associates); Hynes v.
Commissioner, 74 T.C. 1266, 1280 (1980) (sole owner of all beneficial interests in trust
who actively controlled it and its profits as a trustee was an associate).
70 The Sixth Circuit has adhered strictly to the regulations and the Internal Reve-
nue Code mandate to examine the exact wording of the trust instrument in finding a
business purpose:
While we recognize that in some sense this seems to elevate form over
substance, the problems with any other interpretation of the revenue
code and regulations are substantial ones . . . . The determination of
what is or is not an "association" for purposes of section 7701 must be
made in accordance with the declared intentions of the persons setting
up the trust in the trust instrument ....
Abraham v. United States, 406 F.2d 1259, 1264 (6th Cir. 1969). See also, e.g., Rohman v.
United States, 275 F.2d 120, 123-25 (9th Cir. 1960) (trust instrument "in its entirety"
conclusive in establishing a business purpose for trust even though trust instrument lim-
ited trustee's powers and provided disbursement of proceeds of property sale, and even
though the beneficiaries actively managed and leased property and negotiated sales,
while holding property for 50 years); Rev. Rul. 258, 1975-2 C.B. 503, 504 ("Whether an
organization has a business purpose is determined by the instrument creating it.").
71 See, e.g., Outlaw v. United States, 494 F.2d 1376, 1382 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (regardless
of what powers are in trust instrument "it is proper to consider whether or not the
venture actually engaged in business activities").
72 In the years before the Commissioner promulgated the regulations, courts had a
tendency to apply the "associates" and "business purpose" tests loosely in order to give
favorable treatment to trusts that had widows and infants as beneficiaries. In each of the
cases discussed below, however, the beneficiaries were heavily involved in substantial
profit-making activity. Since the promulgation of the regulations, however, no case has
followed this approach, indicating that courts are no longer willing to side-step the asso-
ciates and business purpose tests. .Blair v. Wilson Syndicate Trust, 39 F.2d 43 (5th Cir.
1930) (facts set forth supra note 57) was a case in which the trust deed authorized the
beneficiaries to remove the trustees at will, with or without cause, and fill the vacancies.
The beneficiaries also had the power to amend the trust deed and to terminate the trust
at any time and receive their undivided interests in the trust property. The court did not
find associates or a business purpose despite the trustees' extensive business activities
and the beneficiaries' control over the trustees as well as their ability to control the trust.
Living Funded Trust of Harry E. Lyman v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 161 (1937),
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(continuity of life, centralization of management, free transferability
of interests, and limited liability) are common to trusts and corpora-
tions and are not material in distinguishing between the two enti-
ties. 73 A trust will only be deemed an association if it has both
associates and a business purpose. 74
Although the regulations explicitly define the four minor char-
acteristics, they do not define the two major ones.75 Instead of de-
fining associates and business purpose, the regulations merely
present illustrations of when a trust will be taxed as an association
and when it will be taxed as a trust. These illustrations implicitly
draw on the case law definitions of associates and business pur-
pose.76 A possible explanation for the different treatment is that the
IRS hesitated to stifle the desires of property owners in selecting a
method for disposing of their property. In an ordinary grantor
trust, the property owner creates an arrangement to protect and
discussed supra note 44, involved a beneficiary group of children and grandchildren. In
this case the grantor left to his children and grandchildren his rental real estate and
other businesses for their "maintenance, welfare, comfort and happiness." Id. at 166.
The trust instrument empowered the trustees to "operate any business or interest in
business" with the full powers of an owner, and they exercised these powers. Id. at 162.
Although the court recognized that the beneficiaries did not set up the trust, it ignored
the fact that they subsequently operated it and contributed more than $100,000 to it.
The extensive powers granted the trustees to operate these going concerns and the sub-
sequent active contributions by the beneficiaries should have caused the court to find
both business purpose and associates, but the court denied association status, emphasiz-
ing that it was a family trust for the grantor's offspring.
Magoon Trust Estate, 11 B.T.A.M. (P-H) 42,406 (1942), involved a trust created
by a widow for herself and her children. Where the trustee-beneficiaries extensively
operated the trust businesses, with the beneficiaries transferring and conveying various
properties to each other and to the trust, the court attempted to justify its failure to find
associates and business purpose by saying that the trustee-beneficiaries' control and
management of the properties was not "exclusive" in that they needed the consent of
the widow-grantor in writing. Id. at 42-1012. The court simply ignored the trustees'
extensive powers and control over the trust and the beneficiaries' subsequent activities
with regard to the trust property. The court justified its failure to find these two charac-
teristics at some length, saying the widow wanted to "secure intact to her children the
principal of their father's estate." Id.
73 "Characteristics common to trusts and corporations are not material in attempt-
ing to distinguish between a trust and an association. . . . [C]entralization of manage-
ment, continuity of life, free transferability of interests, and limited liability are generally
common to trusts and corporations .... " Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(2) (1960).
74 The regulations discuss the necessity of having both associates and a business
purpose in the context of co-owners developing their property for their separate benefit:
"Since associates and an objective to carry on business for joint profit are essential char-
acteristics of all organizations engaged in business for profit. . . ,the absence of either of
these essential characteristics will cause [the co-owner's arrangement] not to be classified as
an association." Id. (emphasis added).
75 Continuity of life, centralization of management, limited liability, and free trans-
ferability of interests are defined, respectively, in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) to (e)
(1960).
76 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (1960); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) & (b) (1960).
See supra notes 32-71 and accompanying text.
1158 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 70:1143
conserve property for his own benefit or for the benefit of other
persons. 77 The trust arrangement, a voluntary disposition of prop-
erty, can assume a variety of forms, depending on the grantor's
intent.
Partnerships, on the other hand, are expressly created to jointly
carry on a financial venture,78 a purpose analogous to that of a cor-
poration. A partnership is a way for two or more people to combine
their property or knowledge to "carry on a trade, business, financial
operation, or venture and divide the profits thereof.' ' 79 Possibly be-
cause of these differences, the IRS chose to leave the determinative
factors for trusts to the discretion of the courts but retain strict defi-
nition of partnerships.
The regulations specifically defining whether an organization
should be considered a trust distinguish between "ordinary" trusts
and "business" trusts. The regulations require that only business
trusts be taxed as associations. 80
An "ordinary" trust, according to the regulations, is an ar-
rangement through which trustees protect and conserve property
77 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960).
78 "[T]he term 'partnership' includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or
other unincorporated organization through or by means of which any business, financial
operation, or venture is carried on . Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(a) (1960).
79 Id.
80 A business entity which is established as a trust may possess characteristics that
resemble a corporation in structure and function. See B. BrrrKER &J. EusTIcE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATiON OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 2.03 (4th ed. 1979). Because
certain attributes are common to trusts and corporations, it is necessary to search for
criteria to distinguish an ordinary trust from one that resembles a corporation closely
enough to be taxed as one. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
As indicated in the Introduction, this Note deals only with the taxation of an ordi-
nary trust which resembles a corporation. See supra text accompanying note 7. It does
not address the taxation of the traditional "Massachusetts" or "business" trust. The
business trust, which is taxed as an association, is defined in Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(b)
(1960):
There are other arrangements which are known as trusts because the
legal tide to property is conveyed to trustees for the benefit of benefi-
ciaries, but which are not classified as trusts for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code because they are not simply arrangements to protect or
conserve the property for the beneficiaries. These trusts, which are often
known as business or commercial trusts, generally are created by the ben-
eficiaries simply as a device to carry on a profit-making business which
normally would have been carried on through a corporation. The fact
that any organization is technically cast in the trust form, by conveying
title to property to trustees for the benefit of persons designated as bene-
ficiaries, will not change the real character of the organization if, applying
the principles set forth in Sections 301.7701-2 and 301.7701-3, the or-
ganization more nearly resembles an association or a partnership than a
trust.
Id. For an excellent discussion of the taxation problems attendant to business trusts, see
G. BOGERT, supra note 6, § 247; Barrett & DeValpine, Taxation of Business Trusts and Other
Unincorporated Massachusetts Entities with Transferable Shares, 40 B.U.L. REV. 329 (1960).
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for the benefit of the trust's beneficiaries. The beneficiaries usually
do not participate in planning or creating the trust instrument. This
arrangement would not be taxed as an association; the trust has
neither associates nor a business purpose.8 1 The trust has no asso-
ciates because the beneficiaries are not involved in the trust man-
agement. Similarly, the trust has no business purpose because the
trustees only protect and conserve property rather than use it to
carry on a business.
The regulations also place a trust that has associates but no
business purpose within the ambit of the "ordinary" trust classifica-
tion. The regulations note that even if the beneficiaries are the cre-
ators of the trust, the trust will not be considered an association if
the trustees only protect and conserve property. The beneficiaries
generally are considered associates because of their active involve-
ment in the trust's creation, but the absence of a business purpose
saves the trust from association status.8 2
The regulations contrast the ordinary trust with the business
trust, which is "generally. . .created by the beneficiaries simply as
a device to carry on a profit-making business."8' 3 This entity, which
has associates because the beneficiaries created it, and a business
purpose because of its profit-making orientation, will be taxed as a
corporation.8 4
Thus the regulations delineate three different situations: an en-
tity with neither associates nor a business purpose, an entity with
associates but without a business purpose, and an entity with associ-
ates and a business purpose. The first two will be taxed as trusts,85
while the third will be taxed as an association.8 6 Given this matrix of
interaction between the associates and business purpose tests, the
question arises as to how an entity without associates but with a
business purpose would be taxed. Such an entity exists where the
beneficiaries did not create the trust but the trustees were con-
ducting a business. Although the regulations do not expressly de-
scribe such a situation, they clearly establish that the absence of
either of the two major characteristics prevents association status.
The entity, therefore, would be taxed as a trust.8 7
The absence in the regulations of a specific definition of associ-
ates and business purpose is significant because it gives the courts
81 Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(a) (1960).
82 Id.
83 Id. § 301.7701-4(b).
84 Id. § 301.7701-4(a).
85 Id. § 301.7701-2(a)(2).
86 Id.
87 The regulations cover this situation with the broad requirement that associations
have both associates and a business purpose. Id.
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greater discretion. The regulations simply describe how the two
factors affect the entity's status. This approach highlights the relat-
edness of the two factors. It encourages courts to examine the trust
as a whole rather than to apply the associates and business purpose
tests separately without considering how the tests interrelate.8 8
An example illustrates the danger of applying each test wood-
enly to determine whether the trust is an association. Suppose a
woman creates a trust consisting of an entity which has a stated busi-
ness purpose, a grocery store which she owns and has been manag-
ing. The sole beneficiaries are the woman's two children. A third-
party trustee now manages the store." At the time the woman creates
the trust, it would not be considered an association because the two
children are not involved in the creation or management of the
trust. Suppose that after a few years the two children become em-
ployees of the store, but their jobs consist of carrying out bags for
customers. Should the trust now be considered an association?
Wooden application of the association principles would say "yes"
because the children are now associates, voluntarily and actively
participating in the trust's activity. Looking at the trust as a whole,
however, the trust should not be considered an association.
Although the beneficiaries are active, their participation is unrelated
to the trust's management. They are not involved in a profit-making
business to the degree that a store manager or trustee is. Their ac-
tivities as bag-carriers are actually unrelated to the business purpose
of the trust. If the beneficiaries begin managing the store or ex-
panding the business, however, they would be acting to further the
trust's business purpose and only at this point should they be associ-
ates. A focus on how the beneficiaries' activities relate to the trust's
business purpose will result in more accurate determinations of a
trust's status and give greater effect to the grantor's intent.8 9
88 Id. § 301.7701-4(a). The regulations take a flexible but integrated approach in
describing situations in which associates or business purpose are present, stressing the
importance of the grantor's intent as expressed in the trust instrument, and determining
whether the trust is an association.
89 The recent tax court case of Elm St. Realty Trust v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 803
(1981), involved a trust owning a tract of rental property. The court correctly deter-
mined that the beneficiaries, who had no control over the trust, were not associates,
Under this analysis, however, if they had performed any nominal activity connected with
the property, such as maintenance work, they would have been considered associates.
Contra, Living Funded Trust of Harry E. Lyman v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 161
(1937), where the beneficiaries contributed extensive property to the trust, yet the court
held that they were not associates. Because their activities were closely associated with
the business purpose of the trust, however, the beneficiaries should have been associ-
ates. See supra notes 44, 72 for an extended discussion of the case.
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IV
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT
In evaluating whether a trust should be taxed as an association,
courts should not only apply the associates and business purpose
tests conjunctively. They should also avoid automatically relying on
the language of the trust instrument in determining whether the
trust has a business purpose. Certainly, deriving business purpose
from the trust instrument furthers the policy of giving effect to the
grantor's intent, which often is properly determinative of how the
trust should be taxed. An unvarying adherence to this policy, how-
ever, will occasionally conflict with the fairness policy of the tax laws
that similarly situated entities should be taxed similarly.90
Rigid application of the business purpose test based on the
grantor's stated intent in the trust instrument will work inequity in
cases where a trust with a stated business purpose has in fact never
run a business. If the courts focus mechanically on the trust instru-
ment, two trusts that do not run businesses may be taxed differently,
simply because of a difference in the wording of the trust instru-
ments. In order to advance the sound policy that similar entities
should be taxed similarly, the courts should evaluate trusts realisti-
cally to discern their status as taxable entities instead of relying
strictly on the wording of the trust instruments.
The explanation in Part II of how courts derive business pur-
pose provides the necessary background for an examination of the
undue expansion of the business purpose test undertaken by the
courts. The rule that courts must rely on the wording of the trust
instrument was established in Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates.91
In Coleman-Gilbert, a trust was created to own and operate apartment
houses valued at $3 million and producing approximately $420,000
in gross annual rental income. The Court found a business purpose
90 Article I, § 8 of the United States Constitution provides for equal distribution of
taxes, recognizing Congress's power to collect taxes and the uniformity of duties, im-
posts, and excises throughout the country. This uniformity is generally considered to be
geographical uniformity.
The concept of fairness in taxing similarly situated entities similarly was expressed
in the Supreme Court's opinion in Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 594 (1884): "[A] tax
is uniform when it operates with the same force and effect in every place where the
subject of it is found." Congress has the power to define the class of objects to be taxed,
provided that the tax applies wherever the classification is found. United States v.
Ptasynski, 462 U.S. 74, 82 (1983). One commentator has listed as a primary function of
constructing, interpreting, and administering a tax law that "iflair distribution of the bur-
dens of government expenditures . . . must be the objective of any acceptable taxing
system." He explained that "[flair distribution of burdens is frequently called tax equity.
Horizontal equity is imposing similar burdens on people in like circumstances .... " W.
ANDREWS, BASIC FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 4 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis in original).
91 296 U.S. 369 (1935).
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on these facts alone. The Court correctly rejected the lower court's
finding that no business purpose existed because the trust did not
use formal business procedures, such as having meetings of the ben-
eficiaries, keeping records of the trust's activities, and using a major-
ity vote to authorize action by the trustees. However, the Court
went too far in its opinion and added unnecessary dicta to a clear
holding. After deciding that "[n]ot only were [the trustees] actually
.. .carrying on an extensive business for profit, but the terms of
the trust instrument authorized a wide range of activities," 92 the
Court added, "The parties are not at liberty to say that their pur-
pose was other or narrower than that which they formally set forth
in the instrument under which their activities were conducted.193
Lower courts have adopted this dicta and used it as a license to ig-
nore the trust's actual activities and to focus only on the language of
the trust instrument.
Morrissey v. Commissioner,94 decided the same day, involved a
trust that had actively conducted a business but had exchanged its
assets for stock of a corporation. It then leased back its former
property and continued the business for a short time. The trustees'
activities for the years in question consisted of collecting income
and distributing the profits to the beneficiaries. The Court said the
trust instrument determined the entity's character. "It was. . . still
an organization for profit, and the profits were still coming in. The
powers conferred on the trustees continued and could be exercised
for such activities as the instrument authorized." 95
In cases such as Coleman-Gilbert, where the trust was operating
an active business, and Morrissey, where the beneficiaries were col-
lecting profits from the former business, the trust instrument's
wording is a legitimate aid to deciding how to tax the entity. Never-
theless, this formalistic application of the trust instrument to a trust
that has never conducted business does not further the policy that
similar entities be taxed in a similar manner.
Later cases demonstrate the inequities that can result from this
approach. In Fletcher v. Clark96 a trust was established that gave the
trustees full power to conduct a mining operation in Wyoming. The
trustees never operated the mine, however, confining their activities
to minor maintenance before selling the property. The court re-
jected the trustees' contentions that their actual activities should be
considered instead of the scope of authority granted to them in the
92 Id. at 373-74.
93 Id. at 374; see supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
94 296 U.S. 344 (1935).
95 Id. at 361.
96 150 F.2d 239 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 763 (1945); see supra note 50.
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instrument. The court did not analyze the circumstances of the
trust. Instead it applied the wooden rule that "the character of an
organization in respect to being formed for the promotion of busi-
ness purposes must be determined by reference to the terms of the
declaration of trust."' 97 Although this trust had never conducted a
business and could not be distinguished from a trust that was not
authorized to operate a business, the court's approach resulted in
taxing the two differently. To say that the trust instrument could
have been amended does not redress the problem. If a trust does
not carry on any business activities, to insist that the trust instru-
ment conform to every new purpose elevates form over substance,
the very danger warned against in Coleman-Gilbert.98
A recent tax court case, Elm Street Realty Trust v. Commissioner,99
addressed the same situation. The trust in Elm Street consisted of
rental property conveyed to a trustee. The grantors of the trust
divested themselves of any association with the trust, giving it to
family members as beneficiaries. The trustee, who drafted the trust
instrument, gave himself wide powers in order to deal with any un-
foreseen circumstances but did not grant himself the power to oper-
ate a business. 100 He was a professional trustee and served as
trustee or co-trustee of approximately twenty other trusts in addi-
tion to the Elm Street trust. The tax court adhered to the rule that
the trust instrument is determinative of the trust's status. The court
admitted that "it seems reasonably clear that neither the original
nor the subsequent beneficiaries ever intended that the trust would
engage generally in the operation of a business. Nor can it be said
that a business was ever actually conducted."'u 0 The court then ap-
plied the rule that "the form of petitioner's governing instrument
indicates that petitioner had the potential to operate a business.
• .. The presence of such powers, regardless of their exercise, re-
quire [sic] a finding of a business objective."' 0 2 Thus, the court de-
liberately ignored the obvious lack of any business activity and
concluded from the wording of the trust instrument that the trust
had a business purpose.
The courts have decided that the trust instrument alone cannot
97 Id. at 241.
98 296 U.S. at 373.
99 76 T.C. 803 (1981).
100 Id. at 808, 810.
101 Id. at 810. The court went on, however, to determine that although the trust
possessed a business purpose, the beneficiaries were not associates within the meaning
of the regulations, and the trust, therefore, was not classified as an association. Id. at
818.
102 Id.at810-11.
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transform beneficiaries who are otherwise passive into associates.' 0 3
It is inconsistent, therefore, to use the same trust instrument to
transform a trust that is otherwise passive into an association with a
business purpose.
CONCLUSION
The regulations correctly defer to the grantor's intent in speci-
fying how trusts that resemble corporations should be classified and
taxed. If the grantor intends to use the trust to protect and con-
serve property for designated beneficiaries, the courts generally will
classify the entity as a trust, even though it is almost identical in
form to a corporation. The regulations set forth the associates and
business purpose tests to determine the status of the entities, implic-
itly incorporating well-settled case law to define each characteristic.
In applying these tests, courts should carefully consider the circum-
stances of each case to prevent inequitable taxation. Formalistic ap-
plication could cause a trust that has never run a business to be
classified as an association and taxed as a corporation. In such
cases, the specification of a business purpose in the trust instrument
should be overridden by the settled tax policy of taxing similarly
situated taxpayers similarly. Courts adopting such an approach will
simultaneously advance the accepted social policy of giving effect to
the grantor's intent and avoid inequitable application of the tax
laws.
Colleenj Doolin
103 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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